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Background and Motivation
• A Detect-And-Avoid (DAA) capability is required for UAS 
to meet the requirement in CFR 91.113 to “see and 
avoid” other aircraft and maintain “well clear”.
• RTCA Special Committee 228 is developing Minimum 
Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA 
systems.
• A surveillance system is a critical component of DAA 
system to detect and track intruder aircraft. Thus, the 
MOPS will include surveillance system requirements.
• Encounter characteristics of “well-clear” violations 
between UAS and manned aircraft have not been 
investigated.
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Objectives
• Investigate geometric encounter characteristics 
of well-clear violations between UAS and VFR 
aircraft in Class E airspace
• Investigate the relationship between encounters 
and surveillance system characteristics in terms 
of detection range and field of regard (FOR)
• Generate a database for encounters between 
UAS and VFR aircraft and a knowledge base 
that helps surveillance system designer
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Concept of Well-Clear Violation
• Airborne separation standard
• Time and distance-based definition of “Well-Clear Violation (WCV)”  
– When two aircraft are within distance thresholds
– When the projected closest point of approach (CPA) of two aircraft is 
within a distance-based volume in particular time thresholds 
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Δh : Altitude Difference
τ vert : Time to Co-Altitude
€ 
DMOD = 6000 ft
€ 
HMD = 6000 ft
€ 
ZTHR = 475 ft
τ *mod = 30sec τ *vert = 20sec
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Surveillance Volume
7Intruding event, Intruder and Threat
Event 1
Event 2
Event 3
• Intruding event: Each intrusion into the ownship’s
surveillance volume  
• Intruder: Aircraft that causes intruding events
• Threat: An intruder that finally causes well-clear violation
NAS-Wide Air Traffic Simulation
• Airspace Concept 
Evaluation System (ACES) 
– Simulate NAS-wide air traffic 
operations and unmitigated 
encounters between UAS 
and VFR traffic
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• Traffic scenarios
-Proposed UAS flights 
• Various types of UAS missions generated by Intelligent Automation Inc. 
• Total   18,262 flights,     18,900 flight hours
-Historical cooperative VFR traffic 
• Extracted from Air Defense radar data on 2012
• Selected 7 days: 1/5, 4/6, 4/21, 7/2, 7/22, 7/25, and 10/16
• Each day:  20,439 – 26,770 flights,    16,515 – 24,838 flight hours
Simulation and Analysis
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Bearing Angle Distribution 
at Well-Clear Violation
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Relative horizontal angle (± azimuth angle in deg)
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Effects of Surveillance Parameters
• Selected sets of surveillance parameters
– Surveillance Range:  3, 6, 10, 20 nmi
– Horizontal Field of Regard: (±) 60, 90, 120, 180 deg
– Vertical Field of Regard: (±) 20, 40 deg
– Total 32 sets of surveillance volume (4*4*2)
• Analysis for undetected Well-Clear Violation
– Metric: Ratio of the number of undetected Well-Clear 
Violations for each surveillance volume 
• Analysis for detected Well-Clear Violation
– Metric: Time to Well-Clear Violations of threats at their first 
appearance in each surveillance volume  
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* Percentage of undetected Well-Clear Violations is closely related to horizontal field of regard! 
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Characteristics of undetected WCVs
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• When range=10 nmi, HFOR=120 deg, VFOR=20 deg 
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* The undetected WCVs might be detected if UAS is equipped with a secondary 
sensor having short detection range (~2 nmi) but wide vFOR (~60 deg)
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Example:
Undetected but Already Seen Before
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Time until Well-clear Violation
at First Appearance in the Surveillance Volume
• Time until well-clear violation at the first appearance in the 
surveillance volume is important since it is time for preparing for 
avoiding the violation.
• For all threats, collect data at the time when they first appear in each 
surveillance volume. 
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Analysis of the Time to WCV
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Concluding Remarks
• Analyzed and built a database for well-clear violations 
between UAS and VFR traffic
– Provide system designers a method to conduct trade space 
analysis among surveillance parameter values to meet overall 
system safety metrics
• Observed from a database of this study that
– The ratio of undetected Well-Clear Violations was substantially 
affected by horizontal field of regard
– More than 60% of undetected well-clear violations were incurred 
by the intruders that were seen in the surveillance volumes before
– The time to Well-Clear Violations was most sensitive to 
surveillance detection range
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Future Research
• Extend the current unmitigated surveillance study by
– Using high-fidelity sensor models 
– Running ACES simulations with non-cooperative VFR 
flights and different UAS missions
– Investigating the effect of the SARP-recommended 
definition of well-clear separation standard
• Conduct mitigated surveillance study with a Detect-
and-Avoid system
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Questions?
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